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DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROBLEMS IN THE DEFINITION OF
THE SAME OFFENSE: STATE DISCRETION TO
INVOKE THE CRIMINAL PROCESS TWICE*
WILLIAm

A. HADDAD

AND DAVID

G. MULOCK"*

No one currently questions the great worth of the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy. It justly assures that the state with its
great resources will not be permitted to harass and oppress the individual by multiple prosecution or punishment for the same offense.
The difficulty arises in determining just when we are dealing with the
same offense within the contemplation of the safeguard.
State v. Currie, 41 N.J. 531, 534, 197 A.2d 678, 681 (1963)

(Jacobs, J.)

There is a widely held, if erroneous, assumption that the double jeopardy
provision is "self-executing," in the sense that determination of whether one
has been in jeopardy for the same offense is relatively easy. Application of
the double jeopardy provision, however, often presents complex problems
and comprises a rather intricate area of the criminal law. Moreover,
double jeopardy problems recur so often that they merit more detailed
scholarly attention.
The complexity of the double jeopardy prohibition is reflected in such
issues as waiver, identification of the point when jeopardy attaches, and
determination of whether a subsequent trial will be allowed after jeopardy
has attached in a former incomplete trial- However, most of the complexity

results from the problems involved in defining "the same offense." Although
the problems are related, they will be isolated in this analysis. Text writers
as well as the courts have created confusion by combining dissimilar situations
under the heading of "identity of offenses." Hopefully, identifying various
categories and analyzing them separately will produce a more comprehensive
view of the double jeopardy problems involved.
The situations dealt with involve possibilities of multiple prosecution and
punishment for essentially the same act or transaction. Problems arise because,
while the constitutional provisions prohibit double jeopardy for "the same
offense,"' an offense is not usually considered synonymous with act.2 Although
the state's discretion not to invoke the criminal process may have a greater
* A Table of Headings and Subheadings is appended at the end of this article.
* William A. Haddad, B.A. 1964, J.D. 1967, University of Florida; LL.M. 1968, Yale
University; Member of The Florida Bar.
David G. Mulock, B.A. 1966, Princeton University; J.D. 1969, Florida State University;
Member of The Florida Bar.
1. U.S. CONSr. amend. V: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... ; FLA. CONST. Dec. of Rights §12: "No person
shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense .... "
2. See 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE §145 (R. Anderson ed. 1957).
[515]
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societal impact3 the power of multiple prosecution is patently of greater
concern to defense attorneys since abuse of this power has a greater impact
on their clients.

4

This article focuses on the law of Florida to concentrate primarily on one
system of double jeopardy law, although the method of analysis used is
relevant to the double jeopardy law of other jurisdictions. The double
jeopardy provision has finally been applied to the states via the fourteenth
amendment.5 In part, the long delay may have resulted from a tendency to
minimize problems raised by the application of the prohibition.
THE "SAME

OFFENSE"

AND THE "EXTENDED

ACT"

Double jeopardy problems may arise because of the inherent difficulty in
deciding whether separate offenses are committed by an individual who
precipitates relatively continuous activity involving a sequence of physiological
action. While dealing with conspiracy, assault, attempt, or continuing crimes
the recurring question is essentially the same: When, for double jeopardy
purposes, does one transaction begin and end? Under what circumstances,
if any, are conspiracy, attempt, and assault separate from the completed
"substantive" crime so as to permit prosecution for both? The concept of
continuing crimes presents the analogous problem of separating crimes of
the same type committed proximate in time and under similar circumstances.
Conspiracy
Conspiracy and the crime that is the object of the conspiracy are generally
considered separate substantive offenses, and in Florida are made so by
statute. 6 Since double jeopardy principles apply only to multiple prosecution
for the "same" offense, it follows that:7
(1) Conviction or acquittal of conspiracy to commit a particular
crime does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the crime.

3.
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 18-25 (1967); J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WrrHOUT TRIAL: LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY ch. 8 (1966); Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To

Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of
YALE L.J. 543 (1960).

justice,

69

4. This article concerns the power of multiple prosecution, not the motives that lead
to multiple prosecution in any given case. Frequently where the power exists, it is not
exercised. Various reasons for not invoking the criminal process are advanced in note 3
supra. Speculation as to why the power of multiple prosecution is invoked will not be
attempted here.

5. Benton v. Maryland, 892 U.S. 925 (1968). This case overruled Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
6.

FLA. STAT.

§833.01

(1967) is the general conspiracy statute. But see FLA.

STAT.

§§833.03-.05, which seem to supersede §833.01, making conspiracy itself a felony or misdemeanor, depending on the object of the conspiracy.
7. See I WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE §151
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(2) Conviction or acquittal of a particular crime does not bar a
subsequent prosecution for conspiracy to commit the crime.
Florida law conforms to these general principles. In Wallace v. States a city
official was indicted for extortion from Marie A., a brothel operator. He
pleaded in bar a prior conviction of conspiracy to extort from Melissa Z.,
similarly employed, upon an information charging conspiracy to extort from
Melissa, Mary R., and Marie A. He also pleaded a former acquittal upon an
information charging extortion from Mary. The court held that neither the
former conviction nor the former acquittal was for the same offense:9
While the conspiracy may have been single, and therefore subject to
one indictment only, yet the felonies accomplished by means of the
conspiracy were separate and distinct, depending on different acts,
provable by different evidence, and accomplished by distinct though
similar means.
Brown v. State10 involved an information charging kidnaping and conspiracy to kidnap. The trial court directed a verdict on the conspiracy count,
but during the trial on the kidnaping charge evidence tending to show a
conspiracy was admitted. The appellate court reversed the conviction holding
it error to admit evidence tending only to prove an offense of which the
accused was not guilty by law. By way of dictum, the court stated that, before
the trial court directed the verdict on the conspiracy count, the accused could
have been convicted or acquitted of conspiracy to kidnap, kidnaping, or both,
apparently in the same trial. This is still the prevailing rule in Florida.",
Double jeopardy problems of a more complex character appear in two
other conspiracy situations. The first arises if the substantive offense is the
overt act necessary to sustain conviction on the conspiracy. If that is the
case, according to Wharton, "an acquittal of the substantive offense operates
as an acquittal of the conspiracy count, if the acquittal of the substantive
offense constitutes a determination that the overt act was not committed."'1
Although the statement appears in a discussion of former jeopardy, the
operative principle is in fact collateral estoppel; that is, a bar to subsequent
prosecution of an act necessary for conviction because the first case decided as
a matter of fact that the act did not occur.' 3
8. 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713 (1889).
9. Id. at 558, 26 So. at 717.
10. 128 Fla. 762, 175 So. 515 (1937), clarifying opinion appearing in 130 Fla. 479, 178

So. 153 (1938).
11.

See Sheldon v. State, 178 So. 2d 34 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).

12. See

I WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

374 (R. Anderson ed. 1957).

13. The two cases cited by Wharton both employ language suggesting collateral estoppel.
Ex parte Johnson, 3 Cal. App. 2d 32, 43 P.2d 541 (1935); Oliver v. Superior Court, 92 Cal.
App. 94, 267 P. 764 (1928).
Editor's Note: In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), the United States Supreme
Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel, which bars relitigation between
the same parties of issues actually determined at a previous trial, is embodied in the
fifth amendment prohibition of double jeopardy. The decision reversed the conviction
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A different problem is posed when a conspiracy or agreement is the
gravamen of the substantive offense. In this circumstance a charge of conspiracy in fact charges conspiracy to conspire. In a real sense, prosecution
for both would be multiple prosecution for the same offense. The double
jeopardy prohibition should thus bar prosecution for the reason that the
4
conspiracy and its object are virtually identical.1
A variation of the conspiracy problem arises when an attempt is made to
bring multiple prosecutions for a single conspiracy that has more than one
criminal object. Although separate prosecution for the completed offenses
is permissible, the single conspiracy spawning those offenses would support
only one prosecution. 5

Assault
Florida statutes proscribe various types of assault, 16 which may be either
completely unrelated to other crimes, or so inextricably interwoven with
another crime as to imply that prosecution for both would be prosecution
"for the same offense." For example:
(1) X, fleeing the scene of a bank robbery, assaults a policeman
with a deadly weapon (but without intent to kill).
(2) Y assaults a policeman with a deadly weapon (without intent
to kill). The policeman dies from the assault.
Clearly, committing two separate offenses, X could be prosecuted for, and
convicted of, both robbery and aggravated assault. In the second example,
however, the aggravated assault and murder are part of a logically continuous
sequence, the assault being an included offense. As such, the murder prosecution would bar a subsequent prosecution for the aggravated assault and vice
17

versa.

The Florida statute that makes assault with intent to commit a felony
itself a felony' 8 complicates double jeopardy. What are the consequences
when the felony is consummated? Can there be prosecutions for the assault
to commit the felony as well as the felony itself? In most cases the assault

of a defendant for participating in the robbery of one victim in a multi-victim robbery
after a prior jury had found that he was not guilty of robbing another victim.
14. Accord, Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954); Sealfon v. United States, 332
U.S. 575 (1948); State ex rel. Zirk v. Muntzing, 122 S.E.2d 851 (AV. Va. 1961).
15. Brown v. State, 128 Fla. 762, 175 So. 515 (1937); Trafficante v. State, 136 So. 2d 264

(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961). Of course, the state may always attempt to show more than one
conspiracy.
16. See FLA. STAr. §§784.02 (1967) (assault), 784.03 (assault and battery), 784.04 (aggravated assault), 784.06 (assault with intent to commit felony).
17.

A possible exception, when the victim of the assault dies from the assault but not

until after prosecution for the assault is discussed in text accompanying notes 101-109 infra.
See Southworth v. State, 98 Fla. 1184, 125 So. 345 (1929).
18. FLA. STAT. §784.06 (1967).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol22/iss4/2
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would be a lesser included offense of the felony, governed by principles discussed below that would generally prohibit multiple prosecution.
Attempt
Another aspect of the "extended act" concerns criminal sanctions for both
attempted and corresponding completed crimes. The Florida statute makes
an attempt to commit "an offense prohibited by law" itself an offense. 19
Clearly, one cannot be convicted of both the attempt and the completed crime if they arise out of the same act or set of circumstances. The very
20
concept of attempt contemplates failure to complete the substantive crime.
Thus, prior jeopardy principles are not needed to bar a subsequent trial for
the attempt or the substantive crime after conviction of the other since the
two crimes are by definition mutually exclusive.
However, if tried and acquitted of attempt, can one then be tried for
the completed substantive crime, or vice versa? By definition, a guilty verdict
in the second trial would not be inconsistent with the result in the first trial.
If the second prosecution is to be barred, resort must be made to the double
jeopardy provision. In reality, attempt is no more than a special case of a
necessarily lesser included offense. Just as the accused may be convicted of
an included offense on a trial for the greater offense, he may also be convicted
of attempt on a trial for the greater offense. 2' Accordingly, double jeopardy
principles discussed below should govern and bar a prosecution for either the
attempt or the substantive crime after an acquittal (or conviction) of the
other.
"Continuing" Crimes
Complex double jeopardy problems arise with offenses that continue over
a period of time. The operative definition of "continuing" crimes, for the
purposes of this discussion, includes crimes that are in the last analysis
separate, sequential crimes, but that raise an issue as to whether one continuing crime or several consecutive crimes are involved. Also included in the
definition are true continuing crimes.

19. FLA. STAT. §776.04 (1967). This statute does not purport to cover attempts made
unlawful by specific statutes. See, e.g., attempted arson, which is proscribed by the fourth
degree arson statute, FLA. STAT. §806.04 (1967).
20. See, e.g., Gustine v. State, 86 Fla. 24, 97 So. 207 (1923); Morton v. State, 72 Fla.
265, 73 So. 187 (1916); Groneau v. State, 201 So. 2d 599 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967). The definition of "attempt" in FLA. STAT. §776.04 (1967) sensibly lists failure as an element of an
attempt crime, albeit in common parlance one can attempt and succeed.
21. FLA. STAT. §919.16 (1967). Although Brown v. State, 206 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1968),
separates attempts from included offenses, it treats them no differently. The trial judge
must instruct on attempts at the trial for the greater offense, regardless of whether the
accusatory writ charges the attempt. Moreover, an attempt generally meets the Brown test
of a necessarily included offense: attempt is an "essential aspect" of the greater crime,
without which it cannot be proved. See text accompanying notes 83-109 infra.
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Two distinguishable double jeopardy problems in relation to "continuing" crimes present the following questions:
(1) What may a second accusatory writ validly charge, given a prior
prosecution on an accusatory writ that covered a somewhat extended
period of time?
(2) Assuming a prosecutor wanted to charge as many crimes as
possible and was willing to make each indictment as time-specific as
possible, how many prosecutions can legitimately be maintained in any
given time span (that is, when does one separate and distinct "continuing"
crime end and another begin)?
Concerning the first problem, the validity of a second indictment for
the same series of "continuing" crimes depends on the terms of the prior
indictment (or other accusatory writ). Although an accusatory writ must
include the particular time when the alleged offense was committed, "such
time need not be stated accurately, except in those cases where the allegation
of the precise time is material . . ."22 When time is not material, the indictment or information will sustain a conviction if the proof shows the offense
to have been committed at any time prior to the indictment, within the
statute of limitations.23 The effective period of such an accusatory writ would
thus be two years for most, if not all, "continuing" crimes. Any subsequent
prosecution for similar offenses within that period of time would be barred.24
An accusatory writ may also be drafted to name a certain period of time
within which the offense is alleged to have been committed. Again, the
terms of the initial accusatory writ are material to any subsequent prosecution. In Bizzell v. State,5 an initial information charged embezzlement from
January through October 1952. The accused was found not guilty, whereupon
a second information was filed charging embezzlement in September 1952.
The second prosecution was held barred because the facts charged in the
second information, if found true, warranted a conviction under the first
information. The court reasoned that the appellant had been placed in
jeopardy for embezzlement in September in the first trial; therefore, the jury
necessarily found that he was not guilty of the offense during any time included in the information. Likewise, this result should obtain if defendant
is convicted in the first trial. In both cases, defendant was in jeopardy of
being convicted of any offenses charged during the time covered by the
indictment in the first trial.
In the problems discussed above, the number of possible prosecutions
was limited solely by the breadth of the accusatory writ. A prosecutor has
discretion to draft an accusatory writ in such a way as to limit the extent of

22. Alexander v. State, 40 Fla. 213, 215, 23 So. 536, 537 (1898).
23. Id. See also 17 FLA. JUR. Indictments and Informations §39 (1956) and cases cited
therein.
24. No Florida cases on point have been found. The result suggested above is well
stated in dicta in Morgan v. State, 119 Ga. App. 964, 968, 47 S.E. 567, 568 (1904).
25. 71 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1954).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol22/iss4/2
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protection rendered by double jeopardy. principles. The second question
raises this problem: What are the double jeopardy limits imposed when a
prosecutor in fact drafts an accusatory writ that covers a short span of time?
This presents no problem if the crime involved is clearly not part of a series.
For example, if a prosecutor drafted an information specifying one hour of
a three-hour robbery, a subsequent prosecution for the balance of time would
clearly be prohibited because only one offense had been committed. However, if the offenses are of an allegedly continuing nature, the question then
arises as to how many offenses have been committed.
26
The question is posed, for example, in gambling cases. A Kentucky case
held that a conviction for playing one hand of stud poker did not bar a
subsequent prosecution for playing another, even though both hands were
played during the same sitting. Finding that each hand constituted a separate
offense, the court stressed that winnings were distributed after each hand and
that a new wager was made when the cards were dealt again. In an Alabama
gambling case 27 reaching the same result, the court emphasized that a lapse
of some hours between sittings made for separate offenses. These cases seem
to turn on the easily disputed existence of an identifiable physical termination of the criminal activity for which the initial accusatory writ was brought.
For example, would the Kentucky court have reached the same result if the
card game were of the type requiring several hands to determine who won?
Probably not, since the court stressed that a completed wager was the determining element of a separate offense. Application of the physical termination
test does not appear to violate double jeopardy principles, which prohibit
multiple prosecutions only for the "same" offense, although the test would
produce unjust results in certain cases. In the Kentucky gambling case, for
instance, there were seventy-five hands played in the four-hour game. Conceivably, therefore, appellant had committed seventy-five separate "offenses"
for which he could be cumulatively tried, convicted, and sentenced. A possible remedy for this situation, apart from a humane use of the prosecutor's
discretion, would be a statutory limitation on the number of prosecutions
allowed for such relatively continuous (but separate) offenses.
It appears elementary, therefore, that only one prosecution can result
from a single, uninterrupted, continuing offense even though only part of
the time is specified in the accusatory writ. However, one authority implies
that multiple prosecutions may be brought for various specified chronological
segments of a continuing offense. 28 Some of the cases supporting the black
letter rule in that work allow reprosecution not because a different time is
26. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W. 388 (Ky. 1923).
27. Whatley v. State, 17 Ala. App. 330, 84 So. 860 (1920).
28. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §281 (1961). The black letter heading to that section states:
"A prosecution for a continuing offense is a bar to a subsequent prosecution. for the same
offense charged to have been committed at any time previous to the institution of the first
prosecution, unless the specific date or time is alleged and the state confines its proof
thereto." (Emphasis added.) The emphasized portion of the above statement of the law, in
all fairness supported by some of the cases cited in CJ.S., is unsound. Even if a specific date
is alleged, there should be only prosecution for "a continuing offense."
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specified in the first accusatory writ, but because there was a series of separate,
interrupted offenses, not a single continuing offense. If only one continuing
offense exists, the double jeopardy clause should permit but one prosecution.
Initially, therefore, there can be no reprosecution for any offenses included
in the time period of the first accusatory writ, regardless of whether one
continuing offense or multiple, interrupted offenses are involved. Second, if
an arguably continuous violation of law is involved and the prosecutor specifies only part of the time span, the possibility of prosecution for another
segment depends on whether there are separate, repetitive offenses or a single
continuous offense. The existence of physical interruptions, which break continuity, seems to be decisive in close cases. If one true continuing offense is
found, reprosecution would be for the "same" offense, regardless of how
time-specific the accusatory writ was, and should thus be prohibited.
THE "SAME

OFFENSE" AND "COOPERATIVE

FEDERALISM"

Even if one were satisfied with the comprehensiveness of Austin's definition of law as "commands issued by a sovereign," one would be forced to ask,
in respect to law in the United States: Which sovereign? Criminal jurisprudence is based on federal law, statutes of various states, and municipal
ordinances. When concurrent jurisdiction over a particular offender is
present, double jeopardy problems arise. Moreover, the problems concern
the definition of "the same offense," since the rationale for allowing multiple
prosecution in such cases is that one criminal act may, simultaneously, constitute separate offenses against different sovereigns. The separate sovereignty
problem is dealt with as only one case in which multiple prosecution is
possible for essentially the same act. 29
Prosecutions by Different States
A Florida court faced the question of prosecution by two states in Strobhar
v. State.30 There, an employee of an interstate railroad was convicted of
embezzlement in Florida after having been acquitted in Georgia of larceny
after trust. The defendant appealed the striking of his plea of autrefois acquit,
averring that the two offenses required virtually identical proof and should
be considered the same. Ruling that the defense was unavailable, the court
based its decision on the procedural ground that the defendant failed to plead
with sufficient particularity the former indictment and acquittal in a court
having jurisdiction. The court then proceeded to state that, even if defendant's plea were interpreted as averring a continuous offense committed in
both states, "a conviction or acquittal in the state of Georgia for a violation

29. The writers were especially helped in the preparation of the sections on the
separate sovereignty problem by two articles. See Harrison, Federalism and Double Jeopardy:
A Study in the Frustration of Human Rights, 17 U. MIAMI L. REv. 306 (1963); Note,

Multiple Prosecution: Federalism vs. Individual Rights, 20 U.
30. 55 Fla. 167, 47 So. 4 (1908).
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of its laws would not prevent a prosecution in the state of Florida for the
act in violation of the laws of the latter state."31
Apparently, Strobhar has not been cited as authority for the proposition
that prosecutions by two states for the same crime is not a violation of double
jeopardy principles. However, this result agrees with the holdings of other
state courts that have been faced with the question,3 2 although the statutes
of nineteen other states preclude prosecution when the crime involved is
within the jurisdiction of another state or a territory, and the defendant has
been convicted in one of those jurisdictions. 33
Prosecutions by Federal and State Authorities
The doctrine of dual sovereignty permits successive prosecutions for the
same crime by federal and state authorities.3 4 This doctrine has received the
sanction of the United States Supreme Court in Bartkus v. Illinois.35 In
Bartkus, petitioner was first acquitted on a federal charge of robbing a federally insured bank, then convicted on a state charge of bank robbery. In
upholding the subsequent prosecution, Justice Frankfurter quoted from an
early case: 38
Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory.
He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable
to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act
may be an offence or transgression of the laws of both.
That either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an offender,
cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly averred that the offender
has been twice punished for the same offence; but only that by one act
he has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly punishable. He could not plead punishment by one in bar to a conviction
by the other.
The primary practical consideration noted by the Court in approving the
dual sovereignty theory was the differing interests of the respective governments in punishing the same behavior. The court cited Screws v. United
States,3 7 in which petitioners were tried under federal statutes carrying
maximum combined sentences of three years, while the state crime was a
capital offense.
Abbate v. United States,3 8 decided with Bartkus, involved the reverse
situation: a successful prosecution in an Illinois court for conspiracy to destroy
property, followed by a successful federal prosecution for conspiracy to destroy
31. Id. at 180, 47 So. 4, 9 (1908).
32. See 22 CJ.S. CriminalLaw §296 (c) (1961).

33. See Note, supra note 29, at 360 n.57.
34. The leading case is United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
35. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
36. Id. at 131-32. The early case quoted from was Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.)

13 (1852).
37. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
38. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
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a portion of the communications system of the United States. The Court
again held that petitioners were not placed twice in jeopardy for the same
offense, as the statutes of each sovereign protected a distinct social interest. At
the federal trial, for example, the Government introduced proof that certain
military agencies used some of the facilities that petitioners conspired to
destroy. Presumably, the Illinois statute involved was not drafted to protect
the military communications system. Even if each sovereignty had both
statutes, however, it is unlikely that multiple prosecution could have been
brought by either sovereignty alone since the difference in proof required
would be minimal. Thus, the determining factor was the dual sovereignty
doctrine.
The dual sovereignty theory, as applied by the Supreme Court to successive federal and state prosecutions, conforms to the rulings of twenty-seven
out of the twenty-eight state courts that had faced the question before
Bartkus. The only exception noted in Bartkus was in Burrows v. Morgan, 9
a Florida case that held the eighteenth amendment conferred concurrent
authority to enforce the various prohibitions:
[Sluch power in particular cases [is] to be exercised by either one, but
only by one of the two sovereignties, to the end that violations of the
specified prohibitions shall be redressed by one if the other fails to
act, or by the first one to attain jurisdiction in any case.
However, as suggested in Bartkus, this case should be limited to the interpretation given the eighteenth amendment and its enabling legislation. Other
Florida cases expressly adopt the dual sovereignty theory and suggest its
application in the federal-state reprosecution context.40
Prosecutions by State and Municipal Authorities
Theisen v. McDavid41 represents the Florida approach to prosecutions by
both state and municipal authorities. Petitioner, on trial for violation of a
municipal ordinance prohibiting open stores on Sunday, pleaded double
jeopardy on the ground that a state statute proscribed the same offense. The
court dismissed the argument with a straightforward explanation of dual
42
sovereignty, analogizing the multiple prosecution to the federal-state context:

39. 81 Fla. 662, 666, 89 So. 111, 112 (1921). See also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
n.24 (1959).

40. See Sligh v. Kirkwood, 65 Fla. 123, 127-28, 61 So. 185, 187 (1913): "[W]here both
the acts of Congress and of the State make a defined act an offence, the commission of the
act may be an offence against each, and punishable by each."; quotation from Theisen v.
McDavid, 34 Fla. 440, 16 So. 321 (1894) in text accompanying note 41 infra. Although
Theisen was a state-municipal case, it expressly assumed that the same rationale permitted
multiple prosecution in the federal-state context.
41. 34 Fla. 440, 16 So. 321 (1894).
42. 34 Fla. 440, 443-44, 16 So. 321, 322 (1894).
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[T]he question is assimilated to the dual trials and punishments, the
one in the Federal courts, the other in the State tribunals, that follow
the same act when it infracts both a State law and congressional legislation. Instead of its resulting in two trials and punishments for the
same offense within the contemplation of the constitutional inhibition,
it is regarded as two distinct offenses growing out of the same act; the
one being a transgression of the State law, the other an infraction
of the municipal law.
Unlike situations involving successive prosecutions by different states, or by
state and federal governments, the problem of prosecutions by both state
and municipal governments arises frequently, and abuse is therefore more
likely. Theisen has been relied upon by an unbroken line of Florida cases,
including two very recent cases that have refused to depart from its holding.43
The Rationale of Dual Sovereignty
If crime is considered a transgression against a sovereign, then a single
act may constitute more than one crime in any system that recognizes more
than one sovereign. However, the concept that a crime is an offense against
the sovereign antedates the concept of federalism and should not necessarily
have survived the advent of federalism. It has been suggested that crime be
redefined as a transgression against a social interest, as defined by criminal
statutes of several sovereignties. 44 The number of allowable prosecutions
would depend on the number of social interests trangressed by a single act.
A literal adoption of the standard would result in a broadening of the potential areas of multiple prosecution, however, in that a single act could transgress
many social interests even within the same sovereign. Under well established
double jeopardy principles, one sovereign cannot reprosecute for the same
act based on the same evidence, even if different social interests are involved;
45
use of the same evidence would amount to reprosecution of the same offense.
The social interest test, if ever adopted, should be applied solely as a limit
to multiple prosecution brought under the dual sovereignty theory. Thus, in
Abbate v. United States' 6 the state statute concerned the preservation of
property in general, while the federal statute protected the federal communications system. Arguably, the two statutes pertained to separate social interests,
violation of which would constitute separate offenses against separate sovereigns. In contrast, Bartkus, where petitioner was tried for robbing a bank
and then tried for robbing a federally insured bank, involved essentially the
same offense in that similar interests were involved.

43. Hilliard v. City of Gainesville, 213 So. 2d 689 (1968); Waller v. State, 213 So. 2d
623 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968). Since the writing of this article, Waller has been overturned by
the United States Supreme Court. See note 49 infra.
44. Harrison, Federalism and Double Jeopardy: A Study in the Frustration of Human
Rights, 17 U. MIAMI L. Rsv. 306, 330 et seq. (1963).
45. See text accompanying notes 73-82 infra.

46. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
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If the dual sovereignty theory is awkward when applied to prosecutions
by a state and federal government, its application to prosecutions by municipal
and state governments is even less satisfactory. Florida has long recognized
that municipalities derive all their powers from the state government and
are in no sense sovereign.47 The United States Supreme Court in Grafton v.
United States45 rejected the dual sovereignty theory in an analogous situation.
In that case, the Court held that successive prosecutions by a court-martial and
a territorial court were barred because the authority of both emanated from
the federal government. Whether the court will apply this reasoning to the
49
state-municipal context is a question that may be answered in a pending case.
THE "SAME

Acr"

AS MULTIPLE "NONRELATED"

OFFENSES

What is essentially one act can give rise to several offenses in various
ways, even with the same jurisdiction and even when no aspects of an "extended act" are present. Problems raised by these possibilities are discussed
in the balance of the article, although a basic distinction between "related"
and "nonrelated" offenses must be made. "Nonrelated" offenses are those that,
although they may be similar, are not included offenses or degrees of the
same crime ("related" offenses). Although courts occasionally purport to
apply the same tests to both types of offenses, different double jeopardy
consequences may result; therefore, the two categories have been treated
separately.
The "Same Act" as Both a Criminal and a "Noncriminal" Offense
Since the double jeopardy provision is applicable to "criminal" prosecutions only, the same act may therefore give rise to similar offenses, one
criminal and the other noncriminal, for each of which a proceeding may be
brought and a punishment assessed. The classic case justifying the distinction
involves a criminal offense and the resulting offense against an individual:30
47. See 23 FLA. JUR. Municipal Corporations §§4, 62 (1956). This is generally in accord
with the governmental structure in other states. See 2 E. McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPO§4.03 (3d ed. 1946).
48. 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
49. Waller v. State, 213 So. 2d 623 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968), rev'd sub nom., Waller v.
Florida, 397 U.S. 389 (1970).
Editor's Note: In Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970), the United States Supreme
Court ruled that if a person has been convicted in a municipal court, a subsequent
trial for the identical offense in a state court is violative of the fifth and fourteenth
amendment guarantees against double jeopardy. The rationale for the decision was
that since municipal and state courts are part of the same judicial system the "dual
sovereignty" exception to the double jeopardy rule did not apply. The Court expressly
relied on Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907), as support for the result reached.
The Waller Court did indicate, however, that if acts are committed that are not included
in the municipal court charges, the offender may be subject to further prosecution in the
state courts.
50. Smith v. Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117, 123-24 (1882). The distinction is not so clear when
punitive damages are assessed in the civil case. In Smith the Florida court, although recogRATIONS
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The word jeopardy is therefore used in the Constitution in its defined,
technical sense at the common law. And in this use it is applied only
to strictly criminal prosecutions by indictment, information or otherwise. .

.

. Of course the same act may be an offense [in the sense of

crime] against the State and an offense [in the sense of a tort] against
a private person.
In two other situations, however, offenses are designated noncriminal
with less reason. The first situation arises if a defendant is punished for
contempt and a crime because of exactly the same act. The following situation, raised in a Florida case, 51 is illustrative. A is convicted of contempt of
court because he attempted to bribe a juror. He is then successfully prosecuted for the crime of attempting to bribe a juror, on the same facts, and
given an additional sentence. The Florida supreme court held that the
52
prior sentence did not raise a legitimate double jeopardy question:
It is too well settled to require any citation of authorities here that the
punishment of conduct as a contempt of court will not bar the
criminal prosecution of the accused for the substantive offense committed by such conduct.
The rationale for such a distinction is not elucidated in the cases or the
texts, but seems to be a combination of the following reasoning: (a) different
offenses are committed simply because one is contempt and the other is a
particular substantive crime with a different name, and (b) contempt is not
a criminal offense. The first rationale is totally subversive of the double
jeopardy principle requiring different elements of proof. Although the same
act may give rise to different offenses, mere difference in title or name given
the offense is not enough.53 The second rationale is itself ambiguous, in that
it is used apparently to mean two different things. First, it sometimes means
that contempt actions are "civil" and, ipso facto, cannot constitute jeopardy.
Aside from the fact that some contempts are criminal, 54 this argument is weak
for the same reasons given below in the discussion of administrative punishments. Furthermore, the argument that contempt is not a criminal offense
alleges that contempt is only an offense against the court. Thus, no double
jeopardy ensues because the same act gives rise to a similar offense but
against different entities. In the above, illustration, for example, tampering
with the jury was an offense against both the state and the court.55 This
rationale apparently provides a sound basis for allowing double prosecution
in such a case, provided contempt was limited to more or less direct offenses
against the court and the power was not abused.
nizing some state authority to the contrary, held that the double jeopardy clause would not
prohibit civil action punitive damages after a criminal fine or sentence.
51. Wilson v. State, 122 Fla. 54, 164 So. 846 (1935).
52. Id. at 57, 164 So. at 847.
53. See discussion of this principle in text accompanying notes 73-82 infra.
54. See 6 FLA. JuR. Contempt §4 (1956).
55. Wilson v. State, 122 Fla. 54, 164 So. 846 (1935).
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The same rationale does not apply to contempts for violations against
injunctions, which also constitute criminal offenses. There the offender,
while not directly disturbing the peace or dignity of the court, has been put
under a second obligation not to commit a certain out-of-court act. The
first obligation is the criminal law and the second is the injunction. If
defendant were prosecuted for both, when they were in effect coterminous,
he would be prosecuted for the same act, constituting the same offense and
against the same entity. Apparently, however, no double jeopardy cases have
distinguished direct contempt of court from the indirect type of contempt of
court that is exemplified by violation of an injunction.56 In Florida?- as in
many other jurisdictions, double jeopardy does not prohibit proceedings for
violation of an injunction in addition to a criminal prosecution for the
same act.
Similar problems are presented by the imposition of "civil" penalties by
administrative agencies. Frequently exactly the same act, on exactly the same
proof, is punishable under criminal statutes. Generally, both the civil and
criminal violations may be proceeded against and punished.5 8 Such a result
is not desirable, for defendant arguably is being punished twice for "the
same offense." Rather than imposing an automatic test, a determination
of whether the administrative punishment is really penal in nature should
be made,5 9 considering such factors as whether the proof requirements are
the same, the nature of the punishment assessed, and the purposes of the
sanctions. Admittedly, this type of test would not be easy to apply in every
case. However, a clear distinction exists between the revocation of a license
for an act that is also a violation of a criminal statute,60 and the agency's
56. It may well be argued that violation of an injunction is also an offense against the
court. The contempt power is necessary in the enforcement of injunctions, even those
duplicative of criminal statutes. The point here is that when the injunction is merely
duplicative, the violator should not be subject to a contempt proceeding and a criminal
trial for the same act.
57. See Pompano Horse Club v. State, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (1927). In that case, the
court held that the maintenance of a gambling house could constitute a contempt for
violation of an injunction and a substantive crime itself, in the court's words: "fjT]he same
criminal act thereby giving rise to both punishments." Id. at 434, 111 So. 808.
58. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §240(b) (1961). Although beyond the scope of this
article, the whole area of "administrative crimes" is now receiving much attention. The
double jeopardy problems, of course, are only a small aspect; delegation, due process, and
numerous other problems are also involved. See I K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAw TRAISE
§213 (1951), for delegation problems relating to penalties.
59. Such a determination was made, for example, in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). In these cases the court went beyond
the "civil" designation of juvenile court cases and found that they were essentially "criminal."
Thus, certain rights of defendants in criminal cases also pertained to juveniles subject to
certain juvenile court proceedings. These cases did not expressly deal with the protection
against double jeopardy. Cases are split on the question of whether double jeopardy is
applicable to juvenile court proceedings. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §240, at 629 (1961).
60. The penalty powers given to the new Florida Air and Water Pollution Control
Commission are illustrative. See Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-436, §§15-17. The provision allowing
the state to collect actual damages to waters and aquatic life caused by polluters is clearly
compensatory and is justifiably "civil" for double jeopardy purposes.
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assessment of a penal fine duplicating the corresponding criminal penalty. 61
It is highly probable that some of the punitive functions performed by
administrative agencies would formerly have been considered within the
purview of the criminal law. These penal functions should not be used for
multiple prosecution purposes.
The "Same Act" and Multiple Victims
Just as one act may give rise to several different types of offenses, so may
it give rise to several offenses of the same type by creating multiple victims.
The oft-stated rule, and that generally adhered to in Florida, is that "when
two or more persons are injured by a single act, there is a corresponding
number of distinct offenses ... ,"62 This rule permits as many prosecutions
as there are victims. Some Florida cases allowing multiple prosecutions in
such situations recite the "same evidence" test, contending that a different
63
victim represents an additional fact requiring different proof.
However, various types of multiple victim situations present different
considerations as to the applicability of the double jeopardy provision. In
certain circumstances some jurisdictions bar successive prosecutions for
multiple victims." Florida does not bar such reprosecution, except possibly
in the case of larceny.
An initial hypothetical leaves little doubt that multiple offenses may be
committed and that multiple prosecution should result. A robs B and C at the
same time and place, using the same methods; or A kills B and C by shooting
both of them with successive shots, fired within a few seconds of each other.
Besides the mechanical "multiple victims-multiple offenses" test there is
another reason why multiple offenses have occurred in these examples. A
has actually and consciously committed two different acts, albeit in close
sequence. In the second example the two killings are no less two offenses
than a case in which A killed B and C by shooting the same two bullets,
but a year apart and at different places.

61. In the latter case, double jeopardy should be a bar to multiple prosecution. Such
is not the case, however. In the leading case of Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938),
collection of a penalty for a tax deficiency was permitted after defendant was acquitted
of tax evasion. Revocation of a license, on the other hand, is as much an "administrative"
device for the public good as a penal measure. License revocation may be as severe a
penalty as a given penal fine, but the severity of the measure should not be a touchstone of
its "criminal" nature.
62. See 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw AND PROCEDURE §143 (R. Anderson ed. 1957).
63. See, e.g., Peel v. State, 150 So. 2d 281, 297-98 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963). The court
concluded: "[Jhe murder of Mrs. Chillingworth was a separate crime from that of Judge
Chillingworth, requiring proof of a separate corpus delicti which negatives any finding of
double jeopardy."
64. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §298, at 785 (1961): "[N]o question has given rise to
more difficulty or conflict than that which presents itself when two or more persons are
injured in person or in property by a single act, and on this question there are two
divergent lines of authority."
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A further example presents slightly more substantial double jeopardy
questions. A throws a bomb in a crowd killing B and C; or A poisons the
town's water supply and kills B and C. As far as A's committing separate acts
is concerned, there might appear to be a substantial difference between pulling
the trigger twice and throwing one bomb. But in the second situation, arguably
A has committed multiple acts by knowingly setting in motion forces that
would affect different individuals. A case in which A pulls the trigger several
times, thereby killing several people in a crowd, can only superficially be
distinguished from a situation in which A simply pulls the trigger once on
an automatic rifle and kills several people. In both cases A has set in force
numerous missiles that serve as instruments in the commission of multiple
criminal acts.
A harder question is posed by the following hypothetical: A is culpably
negligent in driving his car, and in a collision B and C are killed. Can A
be separately tried for manslaughter of each? Here it cannot plausibly be
argued that A committed several different acts or that he consciously set in
motion multiple forces. Possibly for these reasons state courts are divided
on the double jeopardy question. 65 Florida courts have been faced with the
issue several times and have held that multiple prosecutions present no double
jeopardy problem. 66 This appears to be a sound result, for two different
offenses were committed against the public. Not only must an added fact
(causing the death of another individual) be proved in each trial, but, on a
broader level, two feloniously caused deaths should be considered two offenses
against the public regardless of whether caused by the same act. Because two
offenses are involved, a prior jeopardy defense should not be permitted on a
subsequent trial for the other killing, regardless of whether the first trial
resulted in a conviction or an acquittal. However, if the first trial results in
an acquittal, the defendant can make a strong case for collateral estoppel at
the second trial.67 In a recent multiple victim manslaughter case in Florida,
65. Compare Windham v. State, 41 Ala. App. 280, 129 So. 2d 338 (1961) and State v.
Cosgrove, 103 N.J.L. 412, 135 A. 871 (1927), with Burton v. State, 226 Miss. 31, 79 So. 2d
242 (1955) and People v. Allen, 368 Ill. App. 368, 14 N.E.2d 397 (1937).
66. See McHugh v. State, 160 Fla. 823, 36 So. 2d 786 (1948); Hanemann v. State, 221
So. 2d 228 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1969); State v. Lowe, 130 So. 2d 288 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961). Perhaps the single act-multiple victim question is presented so often in automobile manslaughter cases because that is the most prevalent form of mass homicide.
67. If defendant wishes to use the first acquittal to estop the state from contending, for
instance, that he was culpably negligent in the second prosecution concerning a different
victim, he must show that the acquittal could only have been based on a finding that he
was not culpably negligent. If there was an issue as to cause of death of victim A, in the
first trial, for example, it would be possible that the first jury acquitted because of lack
of causation as to A's death only; this would not be inconsistent with a finding that
defendant was culpably negligent when he ran over A and B, and caused the death of B
(A dying of other causes). The problem of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is thus the
general verdict, but this problem should not always be considered insurmountable. Sometimes what was necessarily decided in the first trial can be determined if the pleading, proof,
and instructions are examined. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Florida courts would accept
collateral estoppel in multiple victim cases, since in expressly rejecting double jeopardy
arguments they do so in terms broad enough to include collateral estoppel, which they
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68
the majority followed Florida precedent in allowing multiple prosecution.
Although both the majority and dissent relied on double jeopardy, in light
of the acquittal in the first case collateral estoppel was the strongest argument
available to the dissent.
A possible exception to the multiple victim-multiple offense rule in
Florida is larceny of similar property from the same place and at the same
9
time, but which belongs to different victims. In Hearn v. State defendant
stole several cattle belonging to different owners, from the same range, at the
same time, and using the same truck to haul them off. The Florida court
held that only one offense was involved and defendant could not be reprosecuted for cattle stolen from the other owner. Although Hearn concentrated
on continuity of the larceny and did not expressly deal with the multiple
victim question, it constitutes an exception to the rule that each victim
70
represents a separate offense.
The pending case of Ashe v. Swenson71 may provide a Supreme Court
pronouncement on the multiple victim question. Before Benton applied the
double jeopardy prohibition to the states, Supreme 72Court cases held that
multiple prosecution did not offend basic due process.

The "Same Act" and Different Criminal Statutes
This section deals mainly with multiple prosecutions based upon separate
statutes of a single jurisdiction for similar nonrelated offenses committed
in the course of one criminal action. Several tests have been applied in determining whether more than one offense is involved in a given transaction.
The most restrictive test purports to allow only one prosecution for "the
same acte or "same transaction." The drawback to this approach is that it
begs the question by changing the problem of defining "offense" to one of
defining "act" or "transaction." Jurisdictions that employ the purportedly
strict same transaction test sometimes reach results that allow as many
prosecutions as other jurisdictions.7 3 Some of the few jurisdictions employing
the same transaction test do so, not on a direct constitutional basis, but
may have lumped together. Finally, should collateral estoppel also be applied in favor of
the state when there is a conviction in the first case?
68. Hanemann v. State, 221 So. 2d 228 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
69. 55 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1951). This was a 4-3 decision, but since the dissents were
without opinion, it is not clear whether they perceived the multiple victim problem.
70. No subsequent cases directly on point have been found, although several cases are
at least comparable. Where the state prosecutes for larceny of the same property from an
owner it is barred from reprosecution for larceny from the bailee. Wilcox v. State, 183 So.
2d 555 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966); Russell v. State, 107 So. 2d 801 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958). But see
Le Rea v. Cochran, 115 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1959); State v. Anders, 59 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1952). In
the latter cases reprosecution was allowed when the state first attempted to prosecute for
the wrong owner.
71. 397 U.S. 436 (1970), rev'g 399 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1965).
Editor's Note: See note 13 supra.
72. See Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
73. Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 263, 267-77 (1965).
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rather on the basis of "statutes which provide that an act or omission made
punishable by different provisions of the criminal law may be punished under
74
any one provision, but not under more than one."
By far the more widely accepted means of ascertaining the identity of
offenses is the same evidence test. In Gavieres v. United States,7- petitioner
was convinced of rude and indecent behavior in public, and subsequently was
prosecuted for insulting a public official. The court held that the first prosecu76
tion was not a bar:

A conviction or acquittal upon one indictment is no bar to a
subsequent conviction and sentence upon another, unless the evidence
required to support a conviction upon one of them would have been
sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the other. The test is not
whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but
whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense. A single
act may be an offense against two statutes, and if each statute requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal
or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant
from prosecution and conviction under the other.
Clearly, under this test, even one act or transaction can constitute more than
one offense.
Florida courts generally apply the same evidence test-, but the failure
to adhere strictly to this test suggests the presence of other factors deserving
consideration. Minor changes in the description of an offense in the accusatory writ will not justify a second indictment. In Driggers v. State,7 8 the
accused was charged with stealing a calf after he had been acquitted of
stealing a cow. The court found that the offenses were the same, and that the
second prosecution should have been barred under double jeopardy principles.
Judicial qualification of the same evidence test in Florida does not end
with refusal to tolerate different descriptions of the same offense in the
accusatory writ. Deal v. Mayo 79 did not allow a multiple prosecution for the
74. Id. at 276 n.62.
75. 220 U.S. 338 (1911). See also McElroy, Double Jeopardy: The Ephemeral Guarantee,
5 CRIAM.
L. BULL. 375 (1969).
76.

220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911).

77. See State v. Bacom, 159 Fla. 54, 30 So. 2d 744 (1947), aff'd, 39 So. 2d (Fla. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 835 (1949); appeal on writ of habeas corpus denied, Bacom v. Sullivan,
200 F.2d 76, cert. denied, 345 U.S. 910 (1953) (where it was held that a plea of guilty to
driving while intoxicated and reckless driving does not bar prosecution for manslaughter
by culpable negligence in the operation of an automobile); State v. Bowden, 154 Fla. 511, 18
So. 2d 478 (1944) (in which the court held that a prosecution for rape does not bar a
prosecution for unlawful intercourse

with an unmarried

female

of previously

chaste

character under eighteen); King v. State, 145 Fla. 286, 199 So. 38 (1940) (where it
held that acquittal of aiding and abetting arson did not bar prosecution for aiding
abetting arson with intent to defraud an insurer).
78. 137 Fla. 182, 188 So. 118 (1939). See also Presley v. State, 61 Fla. 46, 54 So.
(1911), where dictum states that acquittal of breaking and entering a commissary will
a trial on breaking and entering a warehouse where they are the same building.
79. 76 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1954).
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offenses of desertion of children and withholding support, both proscribed
by one statute, even though somewhat different proof was required. The
court did not elaborate on its decision, but clearly the opinion did not rely on
the same evidence test. A possible explanation of these cases is that the courts
sometimes adopt an actual evidence test instead of the required evidence test
they espouse. Thus, although proof of an additional fact may be necessary
for a similar offense, whether the proof actually adduced at the first trial was
the same as that sought as the second trial would be decisive.
In the more common situation, involving different statutes, Florida again
does not always adhere strictly to the same evidence test and requires more
than mere difference in title or name of the offenses. In Faulkner v. State, 0
the court held that the separate statutory offenses of indecent exposure and
of being a lewd, wanton and lascivious person "are closely related to such an
extent" that prosecution for one would bar prosecution for the other under
the same set of facts. In a similar case"' a prosecution for unlawfully offering
a public officer a reward was barred by a previous acquittal on a bribery
charge arising out of the same facts. The court reasoned that the offenses
"are so closely related that a conviction or acquittal under one constitutes
former jeopardy and a defense to'a subsequent prosecution under the other
82
for the same act."
This type of approach seems more satisfactory than the rigid same
evidence test as a means of determining the identity of offenses. The relevant
inquiry should not be whether any additional fact is required in the second
prosecution, but whether a materially different fact, enough to make a truly
different offense, must be shown.
THE "SAmE AcT" AS MULTIPLE "RELATED"

OFFENSES

Background: The Concept of Included Offenses
The above discussion dealt with the situation in which one act constituted
two or more unrelated statutory offenses against the same sovereign. Multiple
prosecution was said to be possible if the offenses required different proof.
This section is likewise concerned with the situation in which one act constitutes different statutory offenses against the same sovereign. Here, however, the offenses are so "related" that the double jeopardy provision often
applies to prohibit multiple trials, even when the offenses require substantially different proof. The term "related" offenses comprehends either included offenses or different degrees of the same offense.
Although not all included offenses under Florida law will be delineated,
33
a brief analysis of the Florida definition of included offenses is necessary.

80.
81.
82.
83.
divided

146 Fla. 769, 1 So. 2d 857 (1941).
State v. Carroll, 189 So. 2d 273 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
Id. at 274.
Included offenses are not designated as such in the statutes, in contrast to offenses
into degrees.
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In Brown v. State84 the Florida supreme court supplied a lucid definition of
included offenses, dividing them into two classes: those necessarily included
and those that may be included.8 5
Necessarily included offenses are those that form an essential aspect of
the major offense. Thus, larceny is a necessarily included offense of robbery
because there must be some taking in a robbery. Robbery is a larceny plus
something more. The Brown court held that defendant was entitled to an
instruction on necessarily included offenses (and lesser degrees) even if the
accusatory writ did not charge the included offense. The court reasoned that
if the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury on the greater offense, it was
ipso facto sufficient to go to the jury on the necessarily included offense.
The court also dealt with "offenses which may be included," depending
on the accusatory pleadings and the evidence at trial. If an offense is actually
included, even though not necessarily included in the offense charged, defendant has a right to an instruction on it. The example given in Brown is
illuminating. Simple assault is a necessarily lesser included offense of assault
with intent to commit robbery; aggravated assault is not. However, aggravated assault could become an included offense in a given case if the accusatory writ charged use of a deadly weapon in the assault with intent to commit
robbery, and if use of a deadly weapon was proved at trial.
Brown does not involve double jeopardy questions. It does, however,
affect the law of double jeopardy by defining the scope of included offenses
that must be submitted to the jury.8 6 The Brown court observed:87
Actually, we think the requirement [of instructions on included offenses] comports with logic, within the confines of our adversary
system, because it enables the state to have adjudicated in one trial
all aspects of a criminal charge arising out of one transaction. Similarly,
it protects a defendant against a "splitting of accusations with resultant
multitudinous prosecutions and trials."

The manner in which the included offenses doctrine, as well as the concept
of degrees of the "same" crime, relate to the double jeopardy protection is
the subject of the remainder of this section.
Tried for Higher- Convicted of Higher Related Offense
(1) A is prosecuted for, and convicted of, the first degree murder
of B. Can the state then bring a second degree murder case against A
for the killing of B?

84. 206 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1968).
85. The specific examples in the text are taken from Brown v. State, 206 So. 2d 377
(Fla. 1968). Subsequent cases have dealt with other offenses in applying Brown and should
be examined in determining whether an offense is an included one, since the results do not
always follow from the Brown rules.
86. See FLA. STAT. §919.16 (1967); FLA. R. CRINT. P. 1.510.
87. 206 So. 2d 377, 382-83 (1968).
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(2) A is prosecuted for, and convicted of, the robbery of B. Can the
state subsequently prosecute A for the lesser included offense of larceny
arising out of the same incident?
It is well settled that a conviction of the higher offense bars prosecution
for lower included offenses or for lower degrees of the higher offense.88 The
obvious rationale in such cases is that the accused has actually been put in
jeopardy for the lower offense in the first trial.s9
However, even if the defendant was not actually in danger of conviction
for the lesser offense, the conviction of the higher should bar a prosecution
for the lower. The higher crime requires the same proof as the lower "plus
some." On conviction for the higher included offense, therefore, the defendant
has, in effect, already been tried and convicted for the lower crime plus some,
even though the jury never considered the lower crime. 90 Correspondingly,
prosecution for the lesser degree after conviction for the greater may be
barred, even though the first trial presented no actual danger of conviction
for the lesser offense. In this case it can be argued that the lesser crime is a
degree of the same offense for which defendant was convicted.
Tried for Higher- Convicted of Lower Related Offense
(1) A is prosecuted for first degree murder and convicted of second
degree murder. Can A subsequently be prosecuted for first degree murder
of the same victim?
(2) A is prosecuted for robbery and convicted of larceny. Can there
be a subsequent prosecution for robbery, arising out of the same incident?
It is equally well settled that a conviction of a lower offense, on a trial
for the higher, bars a subsequent prosecution for the higher. 91 Conviction of
the lower offense implies an acquittal of the higher; any retrial for the higher
would, thus, run afoul of the autrefois acquit aspect of the double jeopardy
prohibition.

88. 1 WHARTON'S C1a1INAL LA,%v AND PROCEDURE §148 (R. Anderson ed. 1957). See also
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §283 (b) (1961).
89. Under Florida law, for example, defendant has a right to an instruction on a lower
included offense; the lower offense may also be submitted to the jury at the request of
the prosecutor.
90. See State ex rel. Glenn v. Klein, 184 So. 2d 904 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966). In that
case appellant was charged with felony-murder (although he did not kill the victim)
arising out of a robbery. He was subsequently informed against for robbery. The court
of appeal granted a writ of prohibition, on double jeopardy grounds, although the first
jury did not have a robbery charge before it, and it is probable that it was not instructed
on robbery. However, the court's reasoning seemed to be that any time a higher offense was
charged the lower included offense is also necessarily being tried.
91. E.g., Bowden v. State, 152 Fla. 715, 12 So. 2d 887 (1943); West v. State, 55 Fla. 200,
46 So. 93 (1908); Johnson v. State, 27 Fla. 245, 9 So. 208 (1891).
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Tried for Lower - Convicted of Lower Related Offense
(1) A is indicted for second degree murder in the killing of B, and
is convicted of second degree murder. Can A subsequently be tried for
first degree murder of B?
(2) A is indicted for larceny and convicted of larceny. Can A subsequently be tried for robbery, arising out of the same incident?
The jury in this situation did not, either expressly or impliedly, acquit
the defendant of the higher offense by convicting him of the lower, for the
jury did not have the higher offense before it and could not have legally
convicted of the higher offense. Thus, defendant was not in actual jeopardy
of being convicted of the higher offense in the first trial.
If a trial is to be prohibited in such a case, as it is in many states" including Florida, 9 3 it must be on a basis other than actual jeopardy. Here,
the underlying basis for applying the double jeopardy prohibition would seem
to be that the lower offense for which defendant was convicted was so related
to the higher offense (even though proof may differ) that a subsequent
9
conviction for the higher would be a conviction of the lesser offense again. 4
This reasoning is not always expressed; rather, as discussed below, the cases
contain rationales that indirectly suggest the reasoning.
Tried for Lower - Acquitted of Lower Related Offense
(1) A is charged with and acquitted of second degree murder. Can
the state then try him for first degree murder for the same killing?
(2) A is charged with, and acquitted of, larceny. Can the state then
try him for robbery arising out of the same incident?
Here again defendant was not in actual jeopardy of being convicted of
the higher offense, yet many jurisdictions hold that subsequent trial for the
higher would violate double jeopardy. 9 5 The Florida court was faced with
substantially this situation in Sanford v. State.9 6 In Sanford defendant was
92. E.g., People v. Blue, 161 Cal. App. 2d 1, 326 P.2d 183 (1958); Burnett v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 1955); State v. Franklin, 139 W. Va. 43, 79 S.E.2d 692 (1953).
93. See 9 FLA. JR. Criminal Law §204, at 231 (1956), which states that Florida follows
the general rule that "an acquittal or conviction of a lesser offense operates as a bar to a
subsequent prosecution for the higher offense .... ." However, cases cited in that section
concern the situation where defendant was convicted of the lesser offense when charged on
the higher offense. Nonetheless, dicta in these cases suggest that even when not charged
with the higher, conviction of the lower would bar a subsequent prosecution for the
higher.
94. See People v. Greer, 30 Cal. App. 2d 589, 597, 184 P.2d 512, 517 (1947): "A conviction of the lesser is held to be a bar to prosecution for the greater on the theory that
to convict of the greater would be to convict twice of the lesser." (Emphasis added.) This
is one of the few cases directly expressing the rationale.
95. E.g., People v. Krupa, 64 Cal. App. 2d 592, 149 P.2d 416 (1944); Dotye v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.2d 206 (Ky. 1956); Commonwealth v. Thatcher, 364 Pa. 326, 71 A.2d 796
(1950).
96. 75 Fla. 393, 78 So. 340 (1918).
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first charged with assault with intent to commit rape, but was convicted of
assault and battery, which implied an acquittal of assault with intent to
commit rape. Later, defendant was charged with the higher offense of rape
and convicted of assault with intent to commit rape. Because the facts
supporting the second indictment for rape might have convicted defendant
under the first charge of assault with intent to commit rape, the second trial
was barred. In barring the subsequent prosecution, the court first offered
97
the following rationale:
If the first indictment or information were such that the accused might
have been convicted under it on proof of the facts by which the second
is sought to be sustained, then the jeopardy which attached on the first
must constitute a protection against the trial on the second.
Although the result in Sanford is correct for other reasons, this rationale is
excessively broad in attempting to state a general double jeopardy test that
fails when applied to nonrelated offenses (offenses not included or related
by degrees). For instance, a conviction for drunken driving may result from
the proof of facts that permit a subsequent prosecution for the nonrelated
offense of manslaughter by culpable negligence. However, a subsequent
prosecution is allowed because the general test applies only in cases concerning
related offenses. Furthermore, its whole validity as a rule is doubtful since
the results obtained in its application to related offense cases can be obtained
by principles expressly limited to cases involving related offenses. Such
principles were proposed as alternate rationales in Sanford.98
Quoting Wharton, the Sanford court next contended that: "A conviction
of a lesser offense bars a subsequent prosecution for a greater offense in all
those cases where the lesser offense is included in the greater." 99 The court
then, applying the principle to the facts in Sanford, asserted that "an acquittal
of the lesser offense precludes a conviction of the greater." The court reasoned
that the first offense charged was an essential part of the higher offense and
"it would be unreasonable to assume that a man could be guilty of rape
and not guilty of an assault with intent to rape." This approaches a collateral
estoppel argument, but in tying the collateral estoppel theory into the
included offense concept the court was, in effect, holding that these offenses
were so related that they must be considered "the same offense" for double
jeopardy purposes.
Another rationale used in Sanford was that on a subsequent prosecution
for the higher offense defendant could be convicted of the very same lesser
(included) crime for which he was previously acquitted. Indeed, that was
what actually happened to Sanford.
Regardless of the rationale, the Sanford holding was broad enough "to
prohibit the state, which has the right to elect the charge, from first prosecut97. Id. at 341.

98. Other double jeopardy principles essentially irrelevant to the case were also advanced.
99. Sanford v. State, 75 Fla.395, 78 So.340, 341 (1918).
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ing the lower offense necessarily included in a higher and then prosecuting
for the higher."'100 This would seem to apply whether defendant was convicted
or acquitted of the lower offense in the first trial.
Tried for Higher-Acquitted of Higher Related Offense
(1) A is tried for, and acquitted of, first degree murder. Can he
subsequently be tried for second degree murder for the same killing?
(2) A is tried for, and acquitted of, robbery. Can he subsequently
be tried for larceny arising out of the same incident?
As should be apparent from the above sections, a second trial in the above
hypotheticals would constitute double jeopardy for at least two reasons. One
reason, actual jeopardy, is not applicable to the two immediately preceding
sections, but is a factor here. Thus, an even stronger case exists for applying
the double jeopardy prohibition in these hypotheticals.
A Justified Exception: The "Same Act" and the "Subsequent Event"
A assaults and grievously wounds B. A is then successfully prosecuted
for assault with intent to commit murder. Subsequently, within a year
and a day of the assault,""' B dies from the wounds caused by the assault.
Could A then be prosecuted for murder?
It is established that, if A had been tried and convicted of assault with
intent to commit murder after B's death, the conviction of assault with intent
to commit murder as a lesser included offense would bar a subsequent
prosecution for murder.

Otherwise, as the Sanford court pointed out, the

prosecution could start at the lowest included offense and secure convictions
and sentences for every higher related offense. The state should have to
prosecute for the highest offense of which A may be guilty, and in so doing
it may secure a conviction in the same trial of a lesser included offense or a
lesser degree of the highest crime charged if it fails to convince the jury of
the guilt of the higher.
But if the highest possible related offense at the time of the first prosecution was chosen by the state, and subsequent events (such as the death of
the victim in our hypothetical) make a greater offense possible, the state
has a legitimate motive for reprosecution. This is the first time the state
has an opportunity to try the defendant for his highest offense. At the time
of the first trial, the higher offense simply had not yet been committed.
Accordingly, some authority' 02 allows a subsequent prosecution if the higher

100. Id. at 400.01, 78 So. at 342.
101. In many jurisdictions when a period more than a year and a day intervenes between the injury and the death of the victim "the injury is not legally deemed the cause
of the death, and the person who inflicted it is not criminally responsible for the homicide." 40 C.J.S. Homicide §12, at 856 (1944).
102. Some of this authority, for reasons discussed infra is questionable.
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offense was "completed" after the trial of the lesser offense. 10 3 This distinction
appears sound and does not contravene any compelling double jeopardy
policy except in one limited respect. Since an included offense is considered
the same as a higher offense for double jeopardy purposes, the defendant is
being twice punished for the "same" offense, because of the double jeopardy
policy against double punishment for the same offense. This objection is
only to the double punishment; the second trial seems unobjectionable.
Because the higher offense matured only after the first trial, the state should
have a chance to secure a conviction for the higher offense; However, in the
event of a conviction at the second trial the first conviction and punishment
should be set aside. A possible solution would be to provide for compulsory
credit time on the second sentence, 10 4 although no cases applying the above
suggestion are extant.
The only Florida case that has dealt at length with the issue of subsequent
events, Southworth v. State, 05 cites with approval a leading case 08 that
allowed a subsequent prosecution "[w]hen after the first prosecution, a new
fact supervenes, for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the
character of the offense."'10 7 However, the Southworth court was not squarely
faced with the subsequent events question. Southworth had robbed and
assaulted an assembly of at least seven people. He was convicted of assaulting
(and robbing) two victims. Subsequently, a different victim died from
wounds inflicted by Southworth. Clearly, this case should have been decided
on the multiple victim-multiple offense theory, which would also have permitted the subsequent trial.0 8 Other cases citing the relevance of subsequent
death to the double jeopardy question should have been decided on the
ground that different, nonrelated offenses or different victims were involved. 0 9
Had the cases been decided on such grounds, the date of death would have
been irrelevant.

103. See I W-ARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCaIRE, supra note 62, at 353; Annot., 11
A.L.R.3d 834 (1967) and cases cited therein.
104. Completely nullifying the first sentence might raise some problems because, in
Florida: "As a general rule, after a trial court has regularly imposed a sentence and the
term at which it was imposed has passed, the power of the trial court over such sentence
is at an end, except for the purpose of its enforcement. Tucker v. State, 100 Fla. 1440, 1445,
131 So. 327, 328 (1930).
105. 98 Fla. 1184, 125 So. 345 (1929).
106. State v. Littlefield, 70 Me. 452, 35 Am. R. 335 (1880).
107. Id. at 458, 34 Am. R. at 337.
108. See text accompanying notes 62-82 supra. Southworth, nonetheless, was cited in
an attorney general's opinion for the proposition that the subsequent death was what
kept the second prosecution from constituting double jeopardy. The attorney general,
unlike the Southworth court, was faced with a true subsequent event question, since the
subsequent prosecution in question was for the murder of the same person of whom defendant was originally convicted of assaulting. See [19 51-1 9 52] FLA. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL
REP. 774.
109. For example, the cases cited in Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 834 for the subsequent events
theory could have been decided on the above grounds, although this is not pointed out
by the annotator.
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Reversal Because of Legal Error
The application of the double jeopardy provision to related offenses is
further complicated by a successful appeal. Suppose, for example, that:110
A is tried for first degree murder and convicted of second degree
murder. A then appeals the judgment, asserting reversible legal error.
The case is reversed and remanded for a new trial. Can A be retried
for the offense of first degree murder?
Initially, there has been at least an implied acquittal of the highest offense
charged. However, a second trial on remand would not be as much a "different" case from the first as where multiple prosecutions are brought under
separate accusatory writs. There is also an element of waiver presented by
the defendant's appealing the conviction of the lower offense. Are these
additional factors sufficient to allow a retrial for the higher crime following a
successful appeal?
In the leading federal case, Green v. United States,' the Supreme Court
was faced with the above hypothetical and held that the double jeopardy
prohibition barred retrial for first degree murder on remand.1" - The leading
Florida case" 3 encountered exactly the same hypothetical and similarly held
that retrial for first degree murder was barred. The Florida court does not
follow overwhelming state precedent. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in
Green, pointed out that, as of 1957, thirty-six states had considered the
question; of these, nineteen permitted retrial for the greater offense and
seventeen (Florida among these) prohibited such retrial.
The rule as adopted in Florida and the federal courts has two facets.
On retrial the accused may not be charged for a higher offense than that for
which he was convicted. The corollary to this, however, is that the accused
may be retried for the offense of which he was convicted and for lesser related
offenses. This is contrary to the English practice; as mentioned in Green,
the English Court of Criminal Appeals ordinarily does not have the power
to order a new trial after conviction.
Thus, there is a continuum of three rules regarding double jeopardy on
reversal and remand for a new trial:

110. The principles discussed in this section are also applicable in part when a new
trial is granted by the trial judge because of legal error either on a motion for new trial
or a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the trial sentence. See FLA. R. CRINI. P. 1.850.

111.

355 U.S. 184 (1957).

112.

In

effect, this overruled Trono v. United States,

199 U.S. 521

(1905), although

Trono was distinguished as an insular possession case, which involved only a statutory
double jeopardy protection.
113. Johnson v. State, 27 Fla. 245, 9 So. 208 (1891). This case has been followed by an
unbroken line of decisions holding the same way. E.g., Bowden v. State, 152 Fla. 715, 12
So. 2d 887 (1943); West v. State, 55 Fla. 200, 46 So. 93 (1908); Golding v. State, 31 Fla. 262,
12 So. 525 (1893).
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(1) The English rule that a retrial for any "related" offense of which
defendant was put in jeopardy in the first trial, after reversal on appeal,
violates double jeopardy.
(2) The rule in the federal courts and in many states (including
Florida) that, after reversal, defendant may be retried only for the offense
for which he was convicted and lower "related" offenses.
(3) The rule in many other states that after reversal, defendant may
be retried for all "related" offenses, including higher offenses of which
he was impliedly acquitted. (This rule is now subject to question in light
of Benton v. Maryland,"14 which may make Green applicable to the states.)
The rule permitting a new trial for even those higher crimes of which
defendant was expressly or impliedly acquitted is based on two questionable
rationales. The basic rationale is the waiver theory: by appealing the conviction the defendant waives the prior jeopardy defense, not only as to the
lesser crime for which the conviction resulted but also as to the higher
offense of which he was acquitted. This theory was advanced by Justice
Peckham in Trono v. United States:"15
[I]n appealing from the judgment, the accused necessarily appeals from
the whole thereof, as well that which acquits as that which condemns;
that the judgment is one entire thing, and that, as he brings up the
whole record for review, he thereby waives [the double jeopardy
protection] . . .the reversal of the judgment of conviction opens up
the whole controversy, and acts upon the original judgment as if it
had never been.
However, the waiver theory was effectively criticized by Justice McKenna,
dissenting in the same case: 16
[S]uch a result is said to arise from the consent of the accused, deemed
to be given by taking an appeal. An accused would not purposely and
consciously appeal from an acquittal of a grave crime, and cast from
himself the immunity that such an acquittal gives him. Should such
consent be imputed? Let it be remembered that we are dealing with
a great right... a constitutional right .... [A] defendant should not
be required to give up the protection of a just (it must be so regarded
for the sake of the argument) acquittal of one crime as the price of
obtaining a review of an unjust conviction of another crime.
The second rationale for allowing retrial for the higher crime was put
forth by Justice Holmes. Recognizing the weakness of the waiver rationale,
he regarded appeal and retrial as a continuation of the first trial. 117 The
weakness of this position is that it is true in only a limited sense. The appeal
is in reality taken from the conviction of the lower offense; the appellate
court is not empowered to consider the higher offense of which appellant
114. 392 U.S. 925 (1969).
115. 199 U.S. 521, 531-33 (1905).
116. Id. at 539 (McKenna, J., dissenting).
117. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 136-37 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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was acquitted.118 On reversal, the conviction of the lower offense is set aside,
but the acquittal of the higher should not even be considered. The acquittal
was not, and could not, be appealed; it should sustain a plea of autrefois
acquit.
If the waiver theory and Justice Holmes' "continuing jeopardy" theory
are invalid as allowing retrial for the higher offense, can the middle position,
which allows a retrial for the offense of which appellant was convicted and
lesser related offenses, be defended? In short, why allow any retrial? The
answer given in most Florida cases is a sort of modified waiver theory.
Defendant has appealed his conviction or asked the trial judge to grant him
a new trial, thereby waiving his jeopardy in a limited sense.119 This theory
is stronger than the full-blown waiver theory because defendant is appealing
the conviction. However, Justice McKenna's second objection, that waiver
of a constitutional right should not be imputed, still holds and makes this
a rather unsatisfactory ground for allowing even limited retrial.
The soundest rationale is only hinted at in most of the decisions. Holmes'
continuing jeopardy theory is not adequate to allow retrial for the higher
offense of which defendant was acquitted. But the concept is basically
sound as applied to what was actually appealed, that is, the conviction, rather
than the acquittal. Since the prior conviction has been set aside, autrefois
convict does not apply, although autrefois acquit does apply to the acquittal
of the higher offense (not set aside on appeal). Although prior jeopardy may
exist without a prior conviction or acquittal, this does not bar a continuation
of the very same case. Defendant is in jeopardy after the jury is sworn (in a
jury trial) or after the first witness is called (in a nonjury trial), but it would
be absurd to argue that this bars a continuation of the same case after
jeopardy has attached. This is analogous to the retrial situation. On remand,
after reversal for legal error, the trial is a continuation of the original case,
insofar as the offense for which defendant was convicted and lesser offenses
are concerned. These offenses were litigated, appealed, and considered on
appeal in continuous fashion, and are the proper subject of remand, although
defendant must stand forever acquitted of the higher offense.

118. However, in Florida the appellate court may consider and direct a conviction of
lower offenses if sustained by the proof. See FLA. STAT. §924.34 (1967). The original conviction of a "middle" offense is an acquittal of higher offenses because the additional
elements of the higher offense were not found by the jury. But the conviction cannot be
said to be even an implied acquittal of lower offenses since all the elements of the lower
offense may have been found by a jury, which opted to convict defendant of some "middle"
offense. Therefore, the same considerations that apply to the offense of which defendant
was actually convicted apply also to lower related offenses on remand.
119. See 9 FLA. JUR. Criminal Law §210 (1956). The leading case appears to be Gibson
v. State, 26 Fla. 109, 7 So. 376 (1890). Another ground relied on by Florida courts is that
the first conviction, from which defendant was granted a new trial, will not sustain a
double jeopardy plea because it was "a nullity" (or so defective that no judgment can be
rendered upon it). See Little v. Wainwright, 161 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1964); Lovett v. State, 33
Fla. 389, 392, 14 So. 837, 838 (1894). But this theory ignores the fact that whether or not
the conviction was ultimately valid, defendant was validly put in jeopardy.
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Reversal Because of Insufficiency of the Evidence
If the reversal is on the ground of insufficiency of evidence rather than
reversible legal error, a strong argument is available against a new trial
even for the same offense for which appellant was convicted.
To illustrate: A is convicted of first degree murder. On appeal,120 the
court reverses for insufficency of evidence. In so reversing, the appellate court
in effect determines that the jury could not legally convict appellant of first
degree murder even with all the prosecution's evidence before it. If the jury
could not legally convict for first degree murder, it should have acquitted of
first degree murder. Of course, if it had actually acquitted of first degree
murder, the defendant could not be tried again for first degree murder. In
effect, the jury has no alternative except to acquit (or the trial judge to grant
12 1
a directed verdict of acquittal). As the New Mexico supreme court held:
The effect of a reversal for lack of sufficient evidence to support a
conviction is not different from an acquittal by the jury and requires
that the defendant be discharged.
Arguably, a reversal for lack of sufficient evidence demands the application of double jeopardy even more than an actual acquittal. In the former
case, the jury could not legally convict, regardless of the importance given to
the evidence and witnesses and the permissible inferences drawn. The state's
evidence was simply insufficient to support one or more of the necessary
elements of the crime charged. In the latter case, the jury actually acquitted
but may not have been under a duty to do so.122 The evidence may have been
legally sufficient to have permitted a finding of guilt but the jury may have
entertained a reasonable (or unreasonable) doubt.
Even if the above analysis is accepted, a new trial for some offense arising
out of the same act is by no means ruled out. Suppose A's conviction of
first degree murder was reversed (or a new trial granted) because of insufficiency of the evidence of premeditation. Apparently, defendant can subsequently be tried for second degree murder or lesser offenses.123 The jury did
120. This analysis is equally applicable where a motion for new trial is granted by the
trial judge for lack of sufficient evidence, pursuant to FLA. R. Calm. P. 1.600 (a) (2). It should
be noted that the rule refers to "weight" of the evidence rather than "insufficiency" of evidence. A granting of a new trial based merely on "weight" of the evidence does not present the reason to apply the double jeopardy provision if, at the same time, the evidence
is legally sufficient for guilt. Of course, the weight of evidence can be so weak concerning
guilt that there is a legal insufficiency of evidence.
121. State v. Moreno, 69 N.M. 113, 114, 364 P.2d 594, 595 (1961).
122. Once a juror makes findings of fact and inferences that lead to a reasonable doubt
in his own mind, he is under a duty, perhaps as much moral as legal, to acquit even if
the evidence would support a conviction. The point here is that where a jury actually
acquits, the evidence may be strong enough for conviction; where a jury's conviction is
validly reversed for insufficient evidence, the evidence is never strong enough for conviction.
123. FLA. STAT. §924.34 (1967) authorizes an appellate court, when reversing for
insufficient evidence, to direct the trial court to enter judgment for a lesser necessary
offense that was sufficiently proved at trial. See also FLA. R. CRiM. P. 1.620 authorizing a
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not actually acquit him and was under no duty to acquit him of the lesser
offense. Since his conviction was reversed, he is not subject to double punishment for the same act.
Returning again to whether defendant may be retried for the same offense
for which he was convicted on insufficient evidence, a countervailing consideration exists that makes the question a closer one than is apparent from
the above reasoning. The countervailing argument may be supported if one
assumes that there are degrees of "insufficiency" of evidence. Perhaps some
of the reversals "for insufficient evidence" are granted when the appellate
judges merely have substantial doubt about the actual guilt of the accused.1 4
In that case, the appellate judges may want another jury to consider the
evidence in a new trial. Yet if the court were faced with a choice between
affirmance or an absolute discharge, it might choose to affirm since by objective criteria the evidence may be legally sufficient if every jury prerogative of
credibility, judgment, and inference were indulged. Thus, the adoption of the
double jeopardy prohibition may actually increase affirmances in those questionable cases in which there is barely sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. This argument is somewhat weakened, however, if a new trial were
allowed for some lesser offense even if the double jeopardy prohibition
applied. In addition, the prohibition would be applied only when the reversal
was for "pure" insufficiency.
At least two state courts apply the double jeopardy prohibition in such
cases125 and a 1954 Supreme Court decision offers some support.1

26

Although

many Florida appellate cases reversing for lack of sufficient evidence have
routinely remanded for new trial, the double jeopardy question generally has
not been considered.127
CONCLUSION

Benton v. Maryland has finally applied the federal double jeopardy
provision to state prosecutions. However, the incorporation does not solve
the troublesome identity of offense problems that constitute the main basis
trial court to adjudge the defendant guilty of a lesser included offense or degree on a
motion for a new trial if the evidence does not sustain the original verdict.
124. One possible distinction here is between a lack of evidence supporting a material

element of the crime charged and evidence that is inherently weak or seriously contradicted so as to raise reasonable and strong doubt as to guilt. It can be argued that appellate
judges sometimes reverse on the latter grounds when the evidence is technically sufficient.
See, e.g., Lowe v. State, 154 Fla. 730, 19 So.2d 106 (1944); Skiff v. State, 107 Fla. 90, 144
So. 323 (1932). Query: Do appellate judges have the power to reverse in such a case?
125. People v. Brown, 99 Ill. App. 2d 281, 241 N.E.2d 653 (1968); State v. Moreno, 69
N.M. 113, 364 P.2d 594 (1961).

126. See Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373 (1955), apparently receding from Bryan
v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950). In the latter case a waiver theory was applied.
Sapir, however, is a short per curiam opinion without analysis, except for the concurring
opinion of Justice Douglas.
127. See, e.g., Kilbee v. State, 53 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1951); Lowe v. State, 154 Fla. 780, 19
So. 2d 106 (1944); Johnson v. State, 118 So. 2d 806 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960). But see dicta in

State v. Bowden, 154 Fla. 511, 513, 18 So. 2d 478, 481 (1944). Since the mandates in these

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol22/iss4/2

30

Haddad and Mulock: Double Jeopardy Problems in the Defintion of the Same Offense: St
1970.]

DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROBLEMS

for determining the scope of double jeopardy protection in specific cases.
As the preceding discussions have shown, these problems have not always
been satisfactorily resolved. Even though the solutions may be satisfactory,
the reasoning is sometimes confused through the failure to recognize the
number of different identity of offense problems that exist.
Moreover, the potential areas of multiple prosecution for essentially the
same act are quite numerous, prompting an extensive and intricate body of
case law. This case law, far from having been settled, is constantly in a
process of change. The outcome of pending cases still affects the vitality of
the double jeopardy protection, which depends primarily upon the interpretation given the words "the same offense."

cases reversed "for a new trial" without specifying, the new trial might have been for a
lesser offense. The closest a Florida court has come to deciding the question is in Sosa v.
Maxwell, 234 So. 2d 690 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1970). The court concluded that the double
jeopardy protection did not obtain since the reversal was not really for lack of sufficient
evidence. The court expressly did not decide what result would follow if that had been
the case.
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